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ABSTRACT
A COMPARISON OF THE POLICY EFFECTIVENESS OF PARLIAMENTARY 
AND PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS IN REDUCING BUDGET DEFICITS
HÜSEYİN ÇAĞRI SAĞLAM  
M.A. IN ECONOMICS 
Supervisor; Assist. Prof. İzak Atiyas 
July 1997
Political institutions, affect the policymaking capabilities o f the government. These 
capabilities influence the governments’ ability to make strategic policy choices that will help 
them in reaching their policy objectives. One o f the most important choice o f political 
institutions is the system o f government, that is, whether it is parliamentary or presidential. 
This thesis discusses how the choice o f system o f government affects the ability o f reaching 
the policy objective o f reducing budget deficit. It examines the decisionmaking attributes o f  
the two systems and the impact o f these attributes on specific capabilities required to reduce 
budget deficits, namely, “ability to set and maintain priorities among many conflicting 
demands”, “ability to impose losses on powerful groups”, and “ability to allocate resources 
effectively”.
Keywords: Parliamentary System, Presidential System.
Ο Ζ Ε Ι
PARLEMENTER VE BAŞKANLIK SİSTEMLERİNİN BÜTÇE AÇIKLARININ 
DÜŞÜRÜLMESİNDEKİ YETKİNLİKLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRILMASI
H Ü SEY İN  ÇAĞRI SA Ğ LA M  
Yüksek Lisans T ezi, İktisat Bölüm ü  
Tez Yöneticisi : Y. Doç. Dr. İzak Atiyas 
Temmuz 1997
Siyasi kurumlar, hükümetin, stratejik kararlar vererek, ekonomi politikaları belirleme 
ve uygulama yetisini etkiler. Siyasi kurumlar hakkmdaki seçimlerin en önemlilerinden biri, 
devletin yönetim sisteminin, parlementer sistem veya başkanlık sistemi olmasıyla ilgilidir. 
Bu tez, devletin yönetim sisteminde yapılan seçimin, bütçe açığının düşüıülmesi hedefi 
üzerine etkisini tartışmaktadır. Bu hedefe ulaşmak için, hükümetlerin üç yetiye gereksinim 
duydukları belirlenmiştir: “Çelişen seçenekler arasından öncelikli olanları saptayabilme”, 
“siyasi gruplara ekonomik yaptırımlar uygulayabilme” ve “kaynakların etkin kullanımını 
sağlayabilme”. Her iki sistemin siyasi karar yapıları ele alınmakta, ve bu yapıların, bütçe 
açıklarını düşürmede gerekliliği belirlenen hükümet yetileri üzerindeki etkileri 
İncelenmektedir.
Anahtar Sözcükler : Parlementer Sistem, Başkanlık Sistemi.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The last decades oi twentieth century has witnessed a widespread wave of 
democratization around the world. Countries are building the institutions necessary to 
satisfy criteria of effective participation, enlightened understanding and control of 
agenda such as elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, freedom of
expression, and associational autonomy.*
How the newly democratized countries are able to cope with problems such as 
economic development, political and social integration and a high volume of public 
demand on scarce resources will largely determine whether the democratization 
process achieves a lasting stability. How effective they are in responding to these 
problems will depend on many factors , including their choice of political institutions.
Institutions create incentives and disincentives for political actors, shape 
actors' identities, establish the context in which policymaking occurs and can help or 
hinder the construction of democratic regimes. This constructs a causal linkage 
between political institutions and decision making processes which in turn influences 
governmental capabilities. Such an analytical task can be seen in figure 1.
’Dahl, R.A.(1989), "Democracy and Polyarchy", in Young, Binns, Burch,Jaenicke, and Moran cds., 
“Introducing Government”, Manchester University Press, pp 19.
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Source: Weaver, R.K. and Rockman, B. A. (1993),
"Do Institutions Matter", The Bookings Institution, pp.9.
Ten specific capabilities that all governments need can be listed as follows^ :
- To set and maintain priorities among many conflicting demands,
- To target resources where they are most effective,
- To innovate when old policies have failed,
- To coordinate conflicting objectives,
- To be able to impose losses on powerful groups,
- To I'epresent diffuse interests,
- To ensure effective implementation of government policies and stability,
-To make and maintain international commitments,
- To manage political cleavages to ensure that the society does not fall into civil war.
Among all choices of political institutions, the most important one is the 
system of the government, that is, whether it is presidential, semi-presidential or 
parliamentary. Presidential and parliamentary systems come with their own baggage. 
When nations choose a parliamentary or a presidential form, they are choosing a
whole system whose properties arise endogenously.^ We can define presidentialism 
and parliamentarism along two dimensions, whether the chief executive is elected by 
the legislature and whether the term office is fixed. Table 1 portrays these two 
dimensions.
^Weaver, R.K. and Rockman, B.A.(1993), " Do Inslilutions Matter?", The Bookings Institution, pp 6. 
-^Moe,T.M. and Caldwell M.( 1994),"The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A 
Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems", Journal of Institutional and Theoritical 
Economics, vol 150, N o.l, pp 173.
Table I
Classifying Systems of Government
Head of Government 
elected by legislature
Fixed term for head of government 
Yes No
Yes Hybrid
(Swilxerland & Bolivia)
No Presidential
Parliamentary
Hybrid
(No cases)
Source : Main\varring,S.(1993), “Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The 
Difficult Combination”, Comparative Political Studies, vol.26. N o.2, pp203.
Defining stable democracies strictly on the basis of democratic longevity, 
more specifically, at least twenty-five years of uninterrupted democracy, Table 2 lists 
countries (tliose are noted to be stable democracies as of 1992) according to whether 
they have presidential or parliamentary systems.
The purpose of this study is to discuss how the choice between presidential 
and parliamentary system of government affects the government’s ability to conduct 
policy in a specific area, namely, reducing budget deficits. The choice of the policy 
area is motivated by its importance, and by the dissatisfaction with budgetary systems 
in every country. It is widely observed that total government expenditures and budget 
deficits have been growing rapidly in the last few decades.. Budget preparation and 
execution procedures have been criticized as ineffective both in restraining 
expenditure growth and in ensuring that expenditures are allocated efficiently.
Most industrialized countries entered the 80’s with their public finances out of 
order. Oil crises, stagflation, rising debt burdens and rising costs of entitlements had 
generated huge deficits that destabilized the relationship between the government 
budget and the national economy. Fiscal stress turned many governments from 
distributing political benefits into distributors of financial losses. This was a difficult 
adjustment, not every country was able to make it.
Studies on the differences in the manner in which the countries responded to 
those fiscal problems have been widespread. Flaan and Sturm(1993) worked on the 
cross countiy differences in debt accumulation and the size of the public sector of 
member countries of the European Community during the 80’s. They conclude that 
the growth ol government debt is positively related to the frequency of government 
changes and negatively to sound budgetary procedures.
Roubini and Sachs(1989), suggest that in several OECD countries, the slow 
rate at which the post 1973 fiscal deficits were reduced resulted from the difficulties 
of political management in coalition governments. They made clear that there is a 
clear tendency for larger deficits in countries characterized by a short average tenure 
of government and by the presence of many political parties in a ruling coalition.
Grilli, Masciendro and Tabellini (1991) examined the postwar experience of 
18 OECD countries’ striking differences in publie debt policies. They suggest that the 
reasons of these differences are government weakness as measured by their decision 
making capacity and their average durability.
Von Hagen (1992) addresses the question of why certain countries have 
experienced large budget deficits for several years and whether large cross country 
differences can be explained by focusing on the budgetary institutions of European 
Community. He finds strong support for his structural hypothesis, namely, that 
budget procedures lead to greater fiscal discipline if they give strong prerogative to 
the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister, limit universalism (which is defined as 
the property of a budget that ineludes “something for everybody”), reciprocity (which
is “an agreement not to oppose another representative’s proposal in exchange for the 
same favor). He constructs indices that summarize several budgetary institutions:
1. Strength of the position of the Prime Minister or the Finance Minister in 
itragovernment negotiations
2. The limits to parliamentary amendments
3. Type of parliamentary votes
4. Timing of parliamentary votes
5. Degree of transparency of the budget
6. Amount of flexibility in the implementation process.
Alesina, Flaussmann, Hommes and Stein (1996), consider a sample of almost 
all the Latin American countries between 1980 and 1993 and eonstruct an index of 
budget procedures on similar dimensions with that of Von Hagen. They find strong 
evidence that budget procedures and budget institutions do influence budget outcome.
Spolaore (1992) analyzes two broad classes of systems, namely, coalitional 
systems and majoritarian systems, in fiscal stabilization. In coalition systems, 
policymakers tend to act too little and too late. Inefficient delays are increasing in the 
number of parties and in the inter-party political-economic conflict. By contrast, 
majoritarian governments tend to act too often. They exercise policy action even 
when inaction is the inefficient choice.
Poterba (1994), and Alt and Lowry (1994) consider the policy response to 
fiscal shocks in the American states and find that adjustment is slower in states with 
divided control than in states with unified control.
Notice that, studies are concentrating on the reasons of cross country 
differences in budget deficits and how the governments are responding to them 
among OECD countries, European Community Members, Latin American countries 
and American States. They are also considering the differences between different 
forms of presidential systems, divided and unified government cases, and different 
forms of parliamentary systems, coalitions and majoritarian governments. But there is
no study that directly compares the responses of parliamentary and presidential 
systems to fiscal deficits and their tendency to accumulate debt.
The aim of this study is to compare presidential and parliamentary systems 
and evaluate the degree to which their decision making attributes provide 
opportunities in responding to budget deficits. The study proceeds as follows. In the 
proceeding part, characteristics of parliamentary and presidential systems will be 
examined and structural differences between the two will be discussed. Part 3 is 
devoted to the examination of the parliamentary and presidential systems’ ability to 
reduce budget deficits by identifying the required government capabilities. 
Capabilities needed in reducing budget deficit are analyzed under three headings; 
setting and maintaining priorities among many conflicting demands, ability to impo.se 
ios.ses on powerful groups, and ensuring effective allocation of resources. Finally, the 
results are interpreted in conclusion part.
Table 2
Stable Democracies, 1967-1992
Parliamentary Svsleinsi24) Presidential Svstems(4') Other SystemsO)
Australia
Austria
Barbados
Belgium
Botswana
Canada
Denmark
Germany
Iceland
India
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Licchtestein
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands 
New Zeland 
Norway 
Sweden
Trinidad and Tobago 
United Kingdom
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
United States 
Venezuela
Finland
France
Switzerland
Source : Mainwarring,S.(1993), “Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The 
Difficult Combination”, Comparative Political Studies, vol.26. No.2, pp205.
2. STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARY  
AND PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM
The nutin difl'erence bclween presidential and parliamentary systems arises 
from the relationship between executive and legislative branches. In presidential 
democracies, the head of the government is essentially popularly elected. Legislative 
elections and postelection negotiation do not determine executive power. One may 
not be a member of both the legislative and exeeutive branches of government at the 
same time in the presidential system. Presidents are elected for a fixed time period, 
that, under normal circumstances cannot be shortened, and sometimes, due to 
provisions preventing reelection, not prolonged. The president cannot be forced to 
resign because of a no-confidence vote by the legislature. The president is not only 
the holder of executive power, but also the symbolic head of state. Because of these, 
two features of the presidential system stand out as "dual democratic legitimacy" and 
the "rigidity"'*
Dual democratic legitimacy of presidential regimes stems from the fact that 
both the president who controls the executive and an elected legislature enjoy 
democratic legitimacy. This system gives the president, who combines the qualities of 
head of state representing the nation and the powers of the executive, a different 
perspective and creates very different popular expectations than those redounding to a 
prime minister with whatever popularity he might enjoy after receiving the same 
number of votes. The president is a one-person executive, whereas the prime minister 
and the cabinet form a collective executive body in the parliamentary system. Also 
the position of the prime minister in the cabinet can vary from preeminence to 
virtual equality with the other ministers, but there is always a relatively high degree 
of collegiality in decision making. In contrast, the members of presidential cabinets
are mere advisors and subordinates of the president.^
'*Linz,,J.J.( 1994),"Presidential or Parliamentary Demoeraey",in Linz,J.J. and Valenzula,A.,eds.,"The 
Failure of Presidential Democracy ".Johns Hopkins University Press, pp 6.
■‘’Lijphart,A.(1994), “Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy”, in Linz.J.J. and 
Valenzula,A.,cds.,"Thc Failure of Presidential Democracy",.lohns Hopkins University Press, pp 93.
In a presidential system, legislators representing the well-organized, 
disciplined parties that constitute real ideological and political choices for the voters, 
also enjoy a democratic legitimacy. It is possible that the majority of such a 
legislature might represent a different political choice from that of the voters 
supporting a president. Voters with policy preferences in between the two parties’ 
ideal policies, take advantage of this legislative-executive interaction in policy 
formation to bring about moderate policy outcomes by favoring one party in the
legislative election and the opposite party in the presidential election.^ Since both 
derive their power from the vote of the people, a conflict is always latent on who is
better legitimated to speak in the name of people.^
The second main institutional characteristic, rigidity of presidentialism, makes 
the political process broken into discontinuous, rigidly determined periods without 
the possibility of continuos readjustments as political, social, and economic events 
might require. The duration of the mandate of a president becomes an essential 
political factor to which all actors in the political process have to adjust.
On the other hand, in parliamentary systems, the head of government is 
elected by the legislature and subsequently depends upon the ongoing confidence of 
the legislature for remaining in office. If the government loses the confidence of the 
legislative assembly, it must either resign or dissolve the assembly to determine 
whether it or the assembly represents the electorate. Dissolution power is important 
for maintaining support for the government in the legislature.
In the presidential system the legislature and the executive are considerably 
more independent of each other than in the parliamentary systems. The parliamentary 
system is often said to reject the separation of powers in favor of a "fusion" or 
"concentration" of legislative and executive power. Although the concept of 
parliamentary government does imply that the executive and the majority of the 
legislature cannot long be in serious disagreement, that does not mean that they have
^AIcsina,A. and Rosenthal,H.(1995), “Partisan Politics, Divided Government and the Economy”, 
Cambridge University Press, pp 44.
’Linz,J.J.(1994),pp7.
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been fused into a single entity exercising both legislative and executive power.^ As 
legislative assembly and the government maintain separate existence and are able to 
check the actions of each other through withdrawal of confidence or dissolution, there 
is some separation of powers in the parliamentary system also.
In a parliamentary system, all power decisions pass through parliament but 
this must not be confused with the idea that power rests in it or even more 
misleadingly in the assembly itself. A parliamcnr.s effective power is limited, 
sometimes dramatically so, by the powers of the ministry which is only indirectly 
responsible to the electorate, and which may not be effectively checked by the 
assembly either.
From a different perspective, a parliamentary system can be denoted as a 
system of mutual dependence as the prime minister must be supported by a majority 
in the legislature and can fall if it receives a vote of no confidence, but at the same 
time the executive has the capacity to dissolve the legislature and call for elections. 
By contrast, a presidential system can be denoted as a system of mutual independence 
as both the legislative and the chief executive power, the president, have a fixed 
electoral mandate that is their own source of legitimacy.^
The comparison of the presidential and the parliamentary system according to 
the relationship between legislature and executive can be summarized as in table 3.
*Gwyn,W.B.(1986),"Modern Forms of Democratic Government", in GoIdwin,R.A. and 
Kaufman,A.,eds, "Separation of Powers- Docs it still Work?",American Enterprise Institute 
Constitutional Studies, pp 76.
^Stcpan,A. and Skach,C.(1994), “Presidcntialism and Parliamentarism” in Linz.J.J. and 
Valenzula.A., eds., “The Failure of Presidential Dcmoeracy”,Johns Hopkins University Press, pp 121.
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Table 3
Relationship Between Legislature and Executive
Attribute Parliamentary Presidential
Head of State Monarch or President President
Mead of Government Prime Minister PresideiU
Executive Appointed by PM 
from assembly
Secretaries of 
President
Executive members of 
assembly?
Yes No
Executive can dissolve 
assembly?
Yes No
Fixed term for executive? No Yes
Assembly checks 
executive?
Sometimes No
Focus of Power Parliament None
Source : Calvert,P-(1992), “An Introduction to Comparative Politics”, Harvester 
Press, pp 98.
Between parliamentary and presidential systems, in semi-presidential systems 
such as Finland, France, a popularly elected president is head of the state but it is not 
always the head of the government. In Austria, Iceland and Ireland, a president is 
elected by direct popular vote but has only minor power and therefore is not the head 
of the government. In these three countries, the system is parliamentary
notwithstanding the existence of popular elections for president.
*®Mainwaring,S.(1993), pp 202.
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A simple contrast between parliamentary and presidential systems suggest 
substantial homogeneity within each type of system. A closer examination however 
reveals that policymaking structures and processes in parliamentary systems can vary 
tremendously across countries and over time, in their regime types which is defined 
as the modal pattern of government formation and government types such as single­
party majority, single-party minority or minimal majority coalition. Three 
parliamentary regime ideal types with examples of each can be seen in table 4.
Government type differences occur in presidential system, in the form of 
unified and divided government cases. In the unified government case, the same party 
controls both the presidency and congress whereas in divided government the 
presidency and the congress are controlled by different parties. In the United States, 
since 1955, divided governments have become much more common.
13
Table 4
Regime Types among Parliamentary Systems in Selected Countries
Regime Type Modal Government Modal Pattern Secondary
and Country Type of Decisionmaking Coveriiinent types
M u ltip a rty  C o a litio n
Nclhcrlands Two or more parties Highly variable Minority single party
Belgium govern in minimum elite cohesion, government;
Denmark winning coalition, elite stability. oversized coalition;
Norway with parlncrs interest group Majority single parly
Germany changed alter access and variable government
Israel elections veto points
P a r ty G o v e n v n e n t
United Kingdom Two major parties Generally high elite Minority government
Canada alternate majority cohesion, stability; Multiparty coalition
Australia control of government limited interest group 
access, few veto points
government
S in g le-party-c lom in an t
Japan Dominant party rules Generally high elite Minority government
Italy(pre-1970s) alone or as dominant eohesion, stability; few by dominant party;
Sweden(pre-1976) coalition partner for veto points; selective Coalition government
prolonged periods interest group access by opposition parties
Source : Weaver,R.K. and Rockman,B.A.(1993), “Do Institutions Matter”, The 
Bookings Institution, pp 19.
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3. COMPARISON OF PARLIAM ENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL  
SYSTEM S IN I  HEIR ABILITY TO REDUCE BUDGET DEFICITS
The economic objectives of state, such as promotion of growth and development, 
and stability are subject to interpretation and become meaningful only when given 
specific content and reflected in policies." Objectives and policies are determined by 
policymakers whose identity varies among countries depending on the political system 
and the influence of social, economic and historical conditions. In this .sense, the budget 
being a series of goals with money figures attached, is an important area to compare the 
effectiveness of parliamentary and presidential systems.
3.1. General View on the Nature of Budget and Budgeting
A budget contains words and figures that propose expenditures for certain objects 
and purposes. The words describe types of expenditures(salaries, equipment, travel) or 
purposes(preventing war, improving health services, providing low income housing) and 
the figures are attached to each item. Presumably, those who make a budget, intend that 
there will be a direct connection between what is written in it and future events. Budgets 
become links between financial resources and human behavior in order to accomplish 
policy objectives.
Without any restrictions on procedures, without any “structure” and rules. 
Arrow’s Impossibility theorem(1951), implies that a legislature would never produce a 
budget but only legislative “chaos”. Influential work by Shepsle shows that the 
restrictions (“structure”) imposed by procedural rules generally solve Arrow’s problem 
and lead to predictable legislative outcomes.
' ‘Easton,D.(1959), “The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science”, Knopf, pp 129.
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Political economy views the budget proeess as a mechanism for resolving 
conflicts among competing interests. Government activities are tend to be targeted at 
specific groups while being paid lor by the general taxpayer. The incongruence between 
those who benefit and those who pay has important implications. Policymakers 
representing spending agencies or groups benefiting from particular public activities take 
into account the full benefit from expanding the programs they are concerned with , but 
recognize only the part of that part of the costs that falls on their constituencies. As a 
result, policymakers systematically overestimate the net marginal benefit of increasing 
public spending, and, hence, use their political influence to increase spending beyond the 
level that would equate social marginal costs and benefits.
Basing their studies upon a view of the budget as a result of conflicting interests 
of representatives with geographically based constituencies, Weingast, Shepsle and 
Johnsen(1991) address two problems; determination of size of the budget and the 
allocation of projects amongst different districts. They argue that representatives with 
geographically based constituencies ask for spending programs v?hich benefit their 
district and are financed nationwide. Representatives systematically do not internalize the 
effects of spending in his district on the tax burden of the country. The aggregate effect 
of rational representatives facing these incentives is an excessive demand of public goods 
with geographically targeted benefits and diffuse financing costs.
As all policymakers have reasons to behave in the same way, the result is 
excessive spending. Even if current spending is divided efficiently between current and 
future taxes, this leads to excessive deficits and debts, too. This problem is called the 
“common pool” problem of government budgeting, because the problem is not unlike 
that of a common resource exploited by uncoordinated private parties.
^^Inmaii.P.I. and Fitts,M.(1990), “Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. 
Historical Record, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol.6, pp 81.
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The players of this coordination game are our elected representatives and the 
common pool resource is our current and future national taxable capacity. Without 
suitable incentives to consider the implications of their actions on all other elected 
representatives, each player adopts an own best political strategy, which together may 
harm legislature’s collective benefit. That strategy may be to overspend on domestic 
public programs; to overextend tax exemptions, credits, and deductions; and to pay for 
some or all with excessive current period deficits. The net effect is an overutilization of a 
public resource: national wealth. This process is known as “universalism”, which is also 
known as “pork-barrel politics”.
Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen do not address directly the question of how all of 
these demands for pork barrel projects lead to an aggregate budget; that is, they do not 
the explicitly characterize the voting equilibrium. Alesina and Perotti(1996), 
characterizes this critical feature of a voting equilibrium which leads to oversupply of 
pork barrel projects as “reciprocity”. Namely, a representative of the ith district votes in 
favor of a project for district j, expecting the same favor in return from the representative 
of the district j in the next vote. This kind of cooperative behavior amongst 
representatives may be enforced by repeated votes.
Chari and Cole(1993), considering the insights of Weingast, Shepsle and 
Johnsen(1981), suggest that public debt can be used strategically by today’s policymaker 
to influence the choice of tomorrow’s policymakers if the two policymakers have 
different spending priorities. Chari and Cole consider a legislature with the kind of 
spending bias emphasized by Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen and show how this 
legislature will choose to issue debt to spend as much as possible in the first period. The 
reason for high spending, and high debt policy is a combination of the “district bias” 
argument and the strategic debt argument. Between these, there may be a fundamental
17
“prisoner’s dilemma” with respect to budget cuts. All legislators may prefer 
comprehensive budget cuts to a continuation of large deficits but each of them may have 
the incentive to protect its particular part of the budget benefiting its constituencies.
In summary, since political institutions fundamentally alter the perceptions and 
incidence of benefits and costs, they systematically bias project choices away from the 
efficient outcomes. The important sources of spending bias can be summarized in three 
items. The first is a con.sequence of the political definition of benefits and costs and its 
divergence from the economic definition. The second source stems from the districting 
mechanism which divides the economy into disjoint political units. The method of 
project financing through generalized taxation constitutes the third source of bias.
Citizens cannot solve these types of problems requiring collective solutions by 
themselves. It is the government’s duty to handle these problems. In the representative 
democratic systems, government policymaking process includes two main principal- 
agent relationships. In the first one, which is known as “political responsibility”, citizens 
give authority to their representatives, namely legislators, to produce public policies 
under specified rules. Politicians compete each other in order to obtain this authority. On 
the other hand, it is duty of the bureaucracy to implement these specified public policies. 
Thus the second principal-agent relationship known as “administrative responsibility” 
includes legislators and the bureaucrats. Main problem arises from the fact that the 
objectives of the principals and the agents do not coincide each other causing conflicts of 
interest between them. To what extent do the agencies act according to the choices of 
their principals depend on the existing institutions and their mechanisms. In these 
mechanisms, the incomplete information of principals in auditing their agencies, and the 
sanctions on the agents in case of their divergence from the wills of the principals 
become important.
'^WcingashB.R., Sliepslc,K.A., and Johnsen,C.(1981), “The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A 
Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics”, Jornal of Political Economy, vol.89, no.5, pp 346.
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Ill elTcclive governments, politieal and administrative responsibility mechanisms 
work in such a way that policies produced would fit the preferences of the citizens, 
resource allocation would reach cost efficiency and the collective dilemmas would be 
passed over effectively. In this context, the budget, constructed on such a principal-agent 
relationship, is one of the important tools in reaching government effectiveness. Possible 
objectives of the budget can be summarized as follows’'· ;
1. Macroeconomic ,Stability: The budget process should overcome the collective 
dilemmas in government spending, must determine the priorities among these and 
maintain a reasonable balance between total spending and total resources.
2. Effective Resource Allocation: The budget process should encourage governments to 
spend more on the public goods and services that are more valuable and important for the 
citizens. Resources must be allocated to the areas where they would yield higher social 
welfare. The budget process should enable governments to implement projects at 
minimum cost.
3. The budget process should give enough information to the principals to audit agents in 
both political and administrative responsibility.
In order to be able to reach the first objective of the budget, namely 
macroeconomic stability, the government needs the ability to set and maintain priorities 
among many conflicting demands. Between this, the government needs the ability to 
allocate resources effectively in reaching the second objective of the budget.
•'‘Aliyas,!, and Sayin,S.(1996), “Siyasi sorumluluk. Yönetsel Sorumluluk ve Bütçe Sistemi”, mimeo.
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In the budget process, the government, faces the conflict between a larger deficit 
or lower taxes or between cutting spending or increasing taxes. Because of this, the 
ability of government to set and maintain priorities among many conflicting demands 
become important in predicting the whole amount of spending which will constitute its 
resources and will be covered by the taxes levied. Taxes are compulsory contributions 
and they are intended to force household or enterprise to give purchasing power to the 
government. Taxes reduce the disposable income and wealth of those who bear them. It 
has got strong political costs to the governments that are imposing taxes, in the next 
election. Ability of government to impose losses on powerful groups become also 
important. Now the questions of what makes the choice of projects, given a certain total 
budget, more or less efficient and how to make the final allocation of net benefits among 
districts, arise. In the budgeting process, the emphasis turns out to be placed on 
achieving the best returns for a given sum of resources or on obtaining the desired 
objectives at lowest cost. Thus the ability of government to allocate resources effectively 
become important in turning budget an instrument for ensuring efficiency. After all, we 
can think a budget also in terms of a contract. The legislative and executive branches 
promise to supply funds under specified conditions and the agencies agree to spend them 
in ways that have been agreed upon.
Interest in the budget process derives fiom the widespread belief that the process 
itself can shape the decisions made according to its rules. *^ In particular, by changing the 
institutional rules that form the budget process, a government’s fiscal performance can be 
changed in a predictable way. We know that, among choices of political institutions, 
most important one is on the system of the government whether it is parliamentary or 
presidential. Thus, it is clear that, the system of the government may have a significant 
effect on its fiscal performance.
l®Von Hagcn,J., and Harden,I.(1996), “ Budget Proces.ses and Cominilmcnt to Fiscal Discipline”, IMF 
Working Paper, 96/78.
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In order to be able to contrast the government ability to create opportunities in 
solving problems, such as spending biases, arising in budgeting and thus in reducing 
budget deficits in the two systems, their decision making processes and their 
implications will be studied by identifying and incorporating specific variables that link 
them with cross-national variations in the policy making role of legislatures. These will 
include variables having to do with the nature of political institutions and actors external 
to the legislature, their role in the policy making process and their connection with the 
legislature such as executive elites, political parties, constituencies, and interest groups.
To the extend that the members of the legislature are constrained from acting 
autonomously by political actors situated in these external institutions- the legislature's 
policy making role will be restricted. Also, the legislator's claim to a significant policy 
making role may be bolstered by its relationship with broader public outside government. 
That is, the strength of the legislatures connection with the constituencies and groups that 
its members represent may be directly related to its capacity to achieve a strong policy 
making role^^.
There are a number of decision making processes potentially relevant to 
policymaking capabilities that dilfer fairly consistently between parliamentary and 
presidential system, for example, 'party discipline", "centralization of legislative power in 
the cabinet", "degree of centralization of accountability", "recruitment processes for 
government executives". Also the existence of multiple regime and government types in 
the parliamentary system and the possibility of both unified and divided government in 
the presidential system add some more variation on policymaking capabilities. Table 5 
incorporates these relations briefly.
*‘’Olson,D.M. and Mezey,M.L.( 1990),"Parliaments and Public Policy" in 01sen,D. and Mezey,M., eds., 
"Legislatures in the Policy Proccss",Cainbridge University Press, pp 6.
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Table 5
Determinants of Government Policymaking Capabilities
Institutional
constraints
Attributes
of
decision­
making
processes
Source: Weaver, R.K. and Rockman, B.A. (1993),
"Do Institutions Matter", The Booking Institution, pp.25.
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DilTcreiiccs in polilical instiliilioiis, especially regimes and clecloral systems have 
a major effect on the governmental capabilities and thus performance in reducing budget 
deficits. 1 will compare parliamentary and presidential systems in their ability to face the 
problems in budgeting and thus in reducing budget deficits by means of the required 
capabilities that I have mentioned:
- to set and maintain priorities among the many conflicting demands,
- to be able to impose losses on powerful groups,
- ability to allocate resources effectively .
3.2. Setting and M aintaining Priorities Among Many Conflicting Demands
It is not hard for governments to maintain existing priorities in the absence of 
political and economic environment pressures from constituencies. The important 
concern is on rationing scarce resources and trying to equilibrate resources and 
commitments in order to continue the established policies. In these circumstances, when 
setting priorities, government may have to face the conflict between a larger deficit or 
lower taxes or between cutting spending or increasing taxes. It may have to decide if 
inflation or unemployment should be its most important fiscal concern. Between these, 
policy conflicts arising from the competition among ministers, paiiiamenters, parties, 
administrators, and interest groups in recording their preferences appear in the budget.
Important determinants of to what extent government can resolve these conflicts 
are “centralization of legislative power in the cabinet”, “cohesion of government elites”, 
and “absence of effective veto points”. Centralization of legislative power gives 
opportunity to the government in dictating its priorities, maintained in the budget process 
for overcoming the collective dilemmas. Cohesion of government elites make them to
•^Shick,A. (1993), "Governments versus Budget Deficits ”, in Weaver,R.K. and Rockman,B.A. cds., “Do 
Institutions Matter”, The Brookings Institution, pp 188.
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support each other in the achievement of common goals, determined according to the 
maintained priorities. With cohesion of government elites, governiTient would also be 
able to act in a more decisive and consistent manner. On the other hand, existence of 
effective veto points would clearly reduce the government ability to set and maintain 
priorities as it would introduce stalemate in the budget process. Institutions with effective 
veto powers may not share the same objectives with the government and make opposition 
in the specified priorities of government. It is also clear that the polarization of the 
political system and stability would affect the priority setting capability of governments. 
In the more polarized societies, it would be much harder to solve collective dilemmas in 
the budget process. Strong polarization political preferences and pronounced 
distributional conflicts tend to result in excessive deficits and fast accumulation of debts.
Now, I will compare presidential and parliamentary systems in terms of these 
determinants starting from the centralization of legislative power in the cabinet.
3.2.1. Centralization of Legislative Power in the Cabinet :
In the previous section, I considered a political-economy model of the budget 
process focusing on the common pool problem of the public budget. Externality arising 
from the fact that public spending tends to be targeted at individual groups in society 
while the tax burden is widely dispersed creates a bias towards excessive expenditures 
and debt. This bias can be reduced by introducing centralizing elements in the budget 
process, namely, institutional provisions that promote a more comprehensive view of the 
marginal costs and benefits of public activities and diminish the power of special 
interests.
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Me Cubins and Cox(1993), introduces central authority as a solution to colleetive 
dilemmas. This central authority involves three common features :
1. The authority bears the direct cost of monitoring the population faced with collective 
dilemma;
2. The authority possesses by virtue of its institutional position, selective incentives with 
which to punish noncooperative and reward cooperative behavior;
3. The authority is motivated to bear the costs of monitoring and to expend scarce 
resources on selective incentives in punishing and rewarding those whom it monitors, 
either by receiving a substantial share of the collective output or by some other 
compensation sclieme designed to align the personal interests of the authority with the 
level of collective output.
Major implications of the collective dilemmas associated with budgeting in a 
decentralized legislature can be .specified in four items'*’: First, public spending through 
government projects and tax favors should be inefficiently too large. Second, for any 
level of aggregate spending, tax rates should be too low and deficits possibly too high. 
Third, any economic or political shocks which lead to increased public spending should 
be deficit financed. The end result may be an inefficiently large public sector, perhaps 
overly financed with public debt.
In the light of these ideas, the essential purpose of establishing a central authority 
is to create an institutional position whose oecupant has a personal incentive to ensure 
that the collective dilemma is overcome. Thus, centralization of legislative power in the 
cabinet would be effective in overcoming the collective dilemmas by influencing the 
ability to set and maintain priorities among many conflicting demands in the budget 
process. One way to achieve centralization involves collective negotiation among the 
relevant policymakers, namely in the cabinet, to determine binding budget targets early
'®Inman,P.R. and Fitts,M.A.(1990), “Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy:Evidence from the U.S. 
Historical Record”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol.6, pp 92.
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ill llic budgcl process. The oilier way involves vesting the executive brancli of 
government with strategic superiority over the legislative branch.
The fusion of executive and legislative powers in parliamentary systems, offer 
advantages in maintaining and setting priorities. A cabinet offers a centralized session for 
discussing and resolving disputes over priorities and for imposing resource constraints. 
The presidential system, in comparison, is characterized both by decentralization within 
congress and by the absence of definitive mechanisms for resolving conflicts between 
executive and legislative priorities.
Waller Bagehot in his famous study, “The English Constitution” states the reason 
of the effectiveness and responsibility of British parliamentary government and the 
deficiencies of American presidential government as “fusion of powers”. Bagehot’s use 
of the word “fusion” is descripted as “the committee which unites the law making power 
to the law executing power”. The cause of this effectiveness was the close union, the 
nearly complete fusion of the executive and legislative powers with the connecting link 
of “cabinet”.20
The centralization of legislative power in the cabinet, may be effected by the 
strength of legislature for independent policymaking action. The strength of the 
legislature’s policymaking role is most frequently connected to its capacity to resist or 
modify policy initiatives emanating from the executive branch. Legislatuies with strong 
policymaking roles can oppose the executive effectively. This would weaken the 
centralization of legislative power, which is important in effective priority setting.
'^Von Hagen,J. and Hardcn,I.(1996), pp 9. 
20Gwyn,W.B.(1986),pp 79.
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The cciUralizalioii of legislative power will be higher in paiiiaineiUary systems 
than in presidential systems as the policy activity of legislatures will be greater in 
presidential than in parliamentary systems^l. In parliamentary systems, prime ministers 
and cabinets, because of their selection by the parliament and their control of a partisan 
majority are quite likely to see their policy initiatives pass the parliament. Separately 
elected presidents in contrast, usually have a weaker relationship with legislative 
majorities and therefore encounter more difficulty in gaining parliamentary approval for 
what they propose. One reason usually cited for this difference between parliamentary 
and presidential system is the power of the government to dissolve the parliament in 
par!iamentary systems.
The dissolution power of the government in parliamentary systems would 
strengthen the centralization of legislative power in the cabinet as it is an important tool 
in maintaining support for the government in the legislature. If the government losses the 
confidence of the legislative assembly, it must either resign or dissolve (bring a new 
election) the assembly to determine whether it or the assembly represents the electorate. 
This weakens the capacity of legislatures opposition to the policy initiatives as it is not 
guarantee for them to be elected in the next election. They would also fear from being 
dropped from the list in the next election. This type of government is said to reject 
separation of powers in favor of a fusion or concentration of legislative and executive 
power.
On the other hand, the president does not have the power to dissolve the 
legislature. This characteristics of presidentialism, prevalent in many countries reduces 
the centralization of legislative power in the cabinet.22
2'01son,D.M. and Mczey,L.M.(I990), pp 8. 
22Lijphart,A.(l994),pp99.
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Now, 1 will discuss some factors that would affect the centralization of legislative 
power in the cabinet such as centralization of executive branch, the executive level at 
which policy issues are resolved, and the structure of the eoinmittees.
The more centralized nature of the executive bureaueracy of parliamentary 
systems also introduces some advantages in eentralization of legislative power in the 
cabinet relative to presidential systems. The poliey aetivity of legislatures will be 
greater^3 „^^ 1 thus the centralization of legislative power in the cabinet will be lower if 
the exeeutive branch is more decentralized rather than centralized. The emphasis on 
hierarchy and on collective decisions in systems with centralized bureaucracies greatly 
limits the latitude of individual legislators for independent action, whereas in more 
decentralized systems, the latitude for legislative action is gieater.
Similarly, the centralization of legislative power in the cabinet will be higher in 
parliamentary systems as the policy issues are resolved at the highest levels of the 
executive, namely the cabinet. To the extent that issues are resolved at the higher levels 
of executive, the opportunity for legislative action will be lower. This is because when 
high level executives become committed to decisions, the political price of opposing 
increases. Legislators would not face the risk of being dropped from the list in the next 
election and also the career advancement of a legislator depends on its well-going with 
the prime minister. On the other hand, in presidential systems, namely in United States, 
the president’s position on a legislative proposal may be unclear or simply unstated and 
in such instances, a much greater range of legislative activity is possible.^4
230fson,D.M. and Mc7,cy,L.M.(1990), pp 9.
2''OLson,D.M., Davidson,R.H., and Kephart,W.T.(1990), “Industrial Policy Agenda and Options in the 
Congres and the Executive in the United States” in Olson,D.M. and Mezey,M.L. eds., “Legislatures in 
the Policy Process”, Cambridge University Press, pp 92.
28
Another important factor that differs in parliamentary and presidential systems 
and influences the centralization of legislative power in the cabinet is the structure of the 
committees. Committees are vital elements of modern parliaments as they give rise to 
policy expertise in the legislature and implementation of the policy activities of the 
bureaucracy through a division of labor. In some legislatures, committees are permanent 
and in others they are temporary. Permanent committees have relatively slow 
membership turnover, fixed and defined policy area jurisdiction thus provide members an 
opportunity to develop expertise in specific policy areas. They tend to become 
autonomous to some degree and are associated with a more active policymaking capacity 
for legislature. On the other hand, temporary committees are usually reformed with each 
new legislative session and have higher membership turnover and less well-defined 
jurisdiction. Temporary committees are less likely to support an active legislative 
policymaking role.
Permanent committees that function in the United States congress suggest a 
strong committee system and a strong policymaking role for the legislature weakening 
the centralization of legislative power in the cabinet. The British House of Commons, in 
contrast, includes ad hoc committees with non-continuing jurisdictions and greater 
membership turnover rates, and are less likely to have a significant policymaking role.25
In the light of these ideas, parliamentary systems introducing tremendous 
difference in power between cabinet members and backbenchers in amending 
government legislation or proposing their own, leads to a higher degree of centralization 
in the cabinet relative to presidential systems. In presidential systems, congressional 
committees and individual legislators have more opportunities to influence legislation. In 
parliamentary systems, legislative committees have also limited power in influencing 
legislation.
25Lcloup,L.T. and WooIlcy,J.T.(1990), “Legislative Oversight of Monetary Policy” in Olson,D.M. and 
Mczey,M.L. eds., “Legislatures in the Policy Process”, Cambridge University Press, pp 27.
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The degree to which power is centralized in the cabinet would be higher in a 
parliamentary system with a prime minister leading to single-party majority government 
and is surrounded with weak and compliant ministers. However, this possibility has 
raised (ears in some parliamentary systems that cabinet government is being replaced by 
presidential government unchecked by an independent legislation.26
3.2.2. Cohesiveness of Government Elites
This section will discuss the second property that governments need in setting and 
maintaining priorities: “cohesion of government elites”. Government elites are said to be 
cohesive if they share and act according to a common set of policy and political 
interests.
While parliamentary systems generally centralize legislative power, they do not 
guarantee that the elites at the center of the political system will be cohesive. Indeed the 
need to build a majority coalition, either within one party or among several parties, can 
lead to strange bedfollows in parliamentary systems just as it can in the presidential 
system.
Governments made up of a single party holding a minority or a bare majority of 
legislative seats are most likely to be cohesive because they are usually drawn from a 
relatively narrow spectrum of issue opinion. Of course, single-party minority 
governments sacrifice easily influence of legislative veto for gains in cohesiveness. 
Maintaining cohesion is likely to be especially difficult in multiparty coalition 
governments in parliamentary systems and in cases of divided government in 
presidential systems.
26Weavcr,R.K. and Rockman,B.A.(1993), pp 15.
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Individual coalition partners in multiparty coalition governments have distinctive 
interests and distinctive constituencies. There is no single uniform objective function for 
the various political parties in the government that reduces the cohesion of government 
elites. There is likely to be a fundamental “prisoner’s dilemma” with respect to budget 
cuts that I have mentioned brielly in the previous section. All partners in the coalition 
may prefer comprehensive budget cuts to a continuation of large deficits but each of 
them may have the incentive to protect its particular part of the budget against hard 
measures. In the absence of strong coordination between members of coalition to produce 
cooperative outcome, the non-cooperative solution of no budget cutting is quite likely to 
arise.
Also such coalitions join together in government parties that will be competing 
directly against one another in the next election. Because of this, cohesion of government 
elites in multiparty coalition is likely to be especially low in the period leading up to an 
election. On the other hand, while coalitions provide incentives for elite cohesion, the 
governing parties do not want to be perceived as always quarreling against each other 
and cause inefficiencies in government policies, they also try to provide power.
Divided governments function differently and select different policies than 
governments with a single party in power in presidential systems. Roubini and 
Sachs(1989), find that nations with a divided government have higher budget deficits. 
Alt and Lowry(1994), find that states with governors from a party different from that of 
legislature are more likely than single party states to run budget deficits. The estimates of 
Poterba(1994), also suggest that single party states raise taxes and cut spending by 
greater amounts in response to deficit shocks.
2’^ Roubini,N. and Sachs,J.D.(1989), “Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the 
Industrial Democracies”, European Economic Review, No.33, pp 925.
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The reasons for these are lowered cohesion of government elites, where 
legislature and governing parties may not share the same policy objectives and lower 
costs of reaching political consensus in single-party states. It is also clear that divided 
government reflects the contradictions in public opinion over budgetary objectives.
Roubini and Sachs(1989), construct an index of political cohesion based on the 
type and duration of government. The most cohesive governments are unified 
governments, that is, parliamentary systems in which a single-party constitutes the 
government and presidential regimes in which the same party controls both the 
legislative and the executive branches. Coalition governments consisting of only two-like 
minded parties or governments in which presidential and legislative power are held by 
different parties are less cohesive, as expected. Even less cohesive are those governments 
which consist of large coalitions with three oi moie paities.
In setting and maintaining priorities among many conflicting demands, the third 
property that government needs, “absence of effective veto points” is at least as 
important as the existence of centralized decision-making forum and the cohesion of 
decision-making elites.
3.2.3. Absence of Effective Veto Points
The third attribute that affects a government’s ability to set and maintain 
priorities among conflicting demands is the absence of effective veto points. This 
attribute can be measured on several dimensions; the number of veto points, the extent to 
which approval at each point requires more than a simple majority, and the extent to 
which a veto is complete, permanent and nonappealable rather than partial, temporary 
and subject to appeal.
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In the presidential system, governments have numerous veto points, many of 
which operate within the decentralized and bicameral legislators. These introduce 
important obstacles to the government ability to set and maintain priorities among many 
conflicting demands. On the other hand, the president’s veto power over legislation, 
which can be overridden only by extraordinary legislative majorities strengthens 
presidential power a great deal. This veto constitutes an opportunity for presidential 
systems in priority setting as it involves vesting the executive branch with strategic 
superiority over legislative branch. Unless the legislature contains large antipresidential 
majorities, the veto makes the president equivalent of a third chamber of the legislature. 
Not all presidents have veto powers that can only be negated by extraordinary majorities. 
The Venezuelan president's veto, for instance, can in the final analysis be overridden by a 
simple majority unless the Supreme Court agrees with the president that the bill is 
unconstitutional.
In Ferejohn and Shipan(1990), the introduction of presidential veto power into 
their one-dimensional policy spaced, complete information model affects outcomes in a 
subtle way. Veto authority matters when there is a large difference between 
congressional preference and that of the median members of the committees. In case of a 
presidential veto power, they are expecting that agencies would be more likely to reflect 
disparate constituencies than a system without a presidential veto power.
Parliamentary systems, ironically tend to diminish the power of legislatures and 
concentrate it in the cabinet. This does not mean however that veto points in the 
parliamentary systems are narrowed to the single decision point of the cabinet. Some 
veto points can arise from specific features of the system, such as judicial review of 
federalism that are exogenous to the executive-legislative relationship.^^ Many 
parliamentary systems use cabinet committees and inner or political cabinets as an
2*Lijphart,A.(1994), pp 99.
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additional veto points. Otiicrs, Canada Гог example, give the finanee minister or a 
eolleetive body(poliey planning, priorities or treasury board) an effective, if sometimes 
informal, veto over ministry proposals. '^^
Nonmajoritarian decision rules can also increase the effectiveness of vetoes in 
parliamentary system. Threats of ministerial resignations can act as an additional 
nonmajoritarian constraint on majoritarian decisionmaking.
3.2.4. Polarization of tlie Political System and Stability
How strong is the disagreement between the alternative policies, that is, 
polarization of the political system is also important in setting and maintaining priorities 
among conflicting demands. More polarized political systems will lack cohesiveness and 
behave more myopically, that they discount the future more.^Oxhis approach yields the 
sharp empirical prediction that public debts should be larger in more unstable and 
polarized societies.
Disagreement between political actor and on the role of decision-makers(such as 
cabinet ministers or levels of government) make more difficult to change the status-qua 
or enact controversial policies. Disagreement result in postponement of unpopular 
policies. Collective decisions are short-sighted and political conflict is associated with the 
accumulation of public debt. And the more is the public debt, the more difficult is the 
resolution of the political conflict.
29Weavcr,R.K. and Rockman,B.A.(1993), pp 26.
30Grilli,V., Masciendro,D., and Tabellini,G.(1991), “Political and Monetary Institutions and Public 
Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries”, Cambridge University Press, pp 186.
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Alcsina and TabeIIiiii(1990) sliow tluU Ihc greater is the probability of not being 
reelected and the greater is the degree of political and ideological polarization of the two 
parties, the larger will be the budget deficit in a model where the optimal policy is to run 
a budget balance in every period. Cukierman et al.(1989), implies also that political 
instability and ideological polarization leads to high inflation rates and seigniorage 
taxation.
Polarization of parties can increase the possibility of strategic political game 
between governments in office at different points in time which lead to an accumulation 
of government debt which is used as a commitment mechanism. The simplest illustration 
of this idea can be followed from Alesina and Tabellini(1990) by two party system in 
which one likes “defense” and the other likes “social welfare”. They represent the 
interests of different constituencies. When the defense like party is in power, it would 
spend on defense and issue debt so that if the opponent is in power tomorrow, it will 
have to service the debt and will not be able spend much on welfare.
In the more polarized political systems, it can be proposed that parliamentary 
systems when compared to presidential systems would be more successful in reducing 
budget deficits as parliamentary systems are associated with more concentration of power 
and cohesiveness of government elites and give less opportunity of access in their 
policies which would weaken the effects of polarization heavily. Also knowing that the 
proportional systems create coalitions and coalitions in the parliamentary systems 
weaken the centralization of legislative power and the cohesiveness of government elites, 
it can be proposed that majoritarian electoral systems creating single-parly governments 
would be appropriate in order to be able to reduce budget deficits.
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Between polarization, tliere is also a linkage between government’s political 
stability and budget deficits. Roubini worked on 15 OECD countries, and concluded that 
political instability and low average duration of the government lead to higher real 
budget deficils. Poor evaluation of multiparty coalition governments in reducing budget 
deficits can also be attributed to its short expected tenure.
When political power alternates randomly between competing political parties, 
each government will be tempted to leave a legacy of high debt for its successor. Current 
government cares little about the next government’s spending because of polarization of 
political parties. Presumably, the more rapid the turnover of government, the more 
important would be this deficit bias effect. That is, the short tenure of governments may 
increa.se the effect of polarization on budget deficits.
Grilli, Masciendro and Tabellini (1991), Roubini (1991), Haan and Sturm (1993) 
all niake clear that frequency of government changes leads to greater budget deficits. 
Grilli, Masciendro and Tabellini, in their study also make distinction on frequency of 
significant government changes and conclude that it is positively correlated with budget 
deficits.
Roubini and Sachs (1989a), explain government debt growth in their sample of 
15 OECD countries that large coalition governments have higher deficits other things 
being equal than do one-party, majoritarian governments. They argue that, in coalition 
governments, various parties in power make logrolling agreements so as to ensure higher 
outlays benefiting their constituencies. In this respect, knowing that proportional 
electoral systems create coalitions and majoritarian electoral systems create single-party 
governments; government stability will be lower in representational systems and create 
higher budget deficits. Also note that, multi-party coalition may be subject to pressure to 
distribute resources among coalition partners, minority governments may have to build
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ad lioc coaliUons and parly govcrnnicnt regimes are Ihouglit to be especially prone to 
policy reversals. Each of these conditions is likely to work against maximizing economic 
efficiency in targeting resources.
Parliamentary systems have mechanisms that may lead to relatively frequent 
changes in cabinets and governments but this flexibility in changing governments may 
help preserve regime stability. Conversely, fixed electoral time table of presidential 
regimes apparently ensures stability in the head of government but introduces a rigidity 
inimical to regime stability.31
Freedom of presidents to appoint a cabinet without considering the demands of 
coalition parties or even powerful personalities or factional leaders in their own parly 
assures greater cabinet stability. Also, it must be noted that in many parliamentary 
regimes the prime minister is also free to appoint his cabinet, that there is no investiture 
vote of the cabinet or approval of individual ministers, and that often the prime minister 
is voted into office first and then proceeds to form his cabinet. However this is the 
difference from a presidential system, the parliament can deny the prime minister 
investiture or confidence if it disapproves of his cabinet.32
Government instability has been one of the strong arguments against 
parliamentarism and in favor of presidentialism. In this argument, it has been forgotten 
that there is considerable cabinet instability in presidential systems and that in multi­
party systems presidential cabinets are very often also coalition governments, although 
they have the disadvantage that ministers are selected as individuals who do not 
necessarily commit their parties to support their policies.33
3'Mainwan ing,,S.(1993), pp 208. 
32Linz,J.J.(1994),pp32. 
” Linz,J.J.(1994), pp 65.
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Paiiiamentary systems are also generally better at providing stable support for 
governments than multi-party presidential systems. Most parliamentary democracies have 
majority in the legislature most of the time so the governments, though not indefinite, 
has a secure base of legislative support.34 |,^  contrast, the notion of majority government 
is problematic in presidential democracies without a majority party. In parliamentary 
systems, majority governments are those in which the party or the parties with cabinet 
portfolios have a majority in the parliament. In some presidential systems, it is not 
uncommon for a government to have a cabinet member from a particular party, only to 
face the opposition of many members of that party in congress. Cabinet representation 
does not ensure that the party’s congressional representatives will support the 
government.
In summary, centralization of legislative power, cohesiveness of government 
elites and absence of effective veto power are difficult to achieve, given the 
characteristics, decision-making organization and procedures in presidential systems. The 
entire congressional budgetary process is the most decentralized, and fragmentary on 
most issues in the presidential regimes. Between these fundamental features, party 
leadership and control are comparatively weak, opportunities for interest group 
intervention and influence are abundant and distributive policies are pronounced.
With these in mind, Denis Ippolito (1974), states that the result has been to 
severely limit the “capability of the legislative branch to develop integrated and coherent 
policy”. Thus presidential systems provide few opportunities and important risks for 
setting and maintaining priorities among many conflicting demands which is an 
important government capability in reducing budget deficits.
3‘'MainwaiTing,S.(1993), pp 216.
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Weaver and Rockman attribute two important risks to the United States’ 
separation of powers system. Tlie first one is “bidding up” in program expenditures or 
tax cuts as legislature is considered with the president and congressional leaders 
attempting to win credits with voters for taking actions that are more popular than those 
proposed by their opponents, d'he second risk is “stalemate” that if the president and 
congress are unable to arrive at a workable long-term compromise, existing policies and 
priorities are likely to remain unchanged. Stalemate has harmful effects on priority 
setting capacity of governments when the budget is in defieit and the president and the 
congress are wrangling over the allocation of losses.
Divided party eontrol of the executive and legislative branches increases the risks 
of bidding up and stalemate which inhibit effective priority setting. Divided government 
reflects the contradictions in public opinion over budgetary objectives. An interparty 
stalemate characterized budgeting during most of the 80’s in United States; a republican 
president wanted no tax increase and deep program retachment while congressional 
democrats wanted to increase additional revenue to finance their program ambitions. 
Throughout 80’s, neither side was able to dislodge the other from its eore positions.
Similar to divided governments in presidential systems, coalition governments in 
parliamentary systems reduce the eapacity of government priority setting as it is subject 
to the same risks attributed to presidential systems. Coalition governments endure as the 
governing parties act according to the ongoing protocol denoted as a partnership of 
convenience. Coalition partners have got the disadvantage of valuing the objectives of 
budget differently. This difference over priorities would postpone the adoption of 
policies. Also it must be noted that conflicts would increase in periods leading to 
elections.
35weavcr,R.K. and Rockinan,B.A.(1993), pp 229.
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3.3. Ability to Impose Losses on Powerful Groups
Imposing losses on powerful domestic groups is another important and difficult 
capability required in reducing budget deficits. The reasoning is that deficit reduction 
would have to entail by tax hikes or program shrinkages. The difficulty of imposing 
losses arises from its concentrated, immediate, highly visible political costs while the 
benefits are contingent, diffuse and long-term. Also evidence suggests that voters poses a 
“negativity bias” that they are more aware of losses than of equivalent gains.
When policymakers in democratic systems impose losses, they face the risk of 
being punished by voters at a later date. Adoption and implementation of loss-imposing 
proposals usually requires approval at several points, such as party, cabinet, legislature 
within the government. Thus in order to be able to impose losses on powerful groups, 
governing party leaders must be able to control their party members; prime ministers or 
presidents may need to overcome the opposition by promoting opponents. That is, 
“centralization of legislative power”, “cohesiveness of government elites”, ’’absence of 
effective veto points”, ‘strong party discipline”, “recruitment of ministers from the 
legislature” are the capabilities needed. Also, in order not to be easily blamed for the 
losses imposed by the powerful groups, “diffusing or limiting accountability” become 
important in government’s ability to impose losses on powerful groups.
Centralization of legislative power, absence of effective veto points, cohesiveness 
of government elites characterize majority governments in a parliamentary system and 
offer important opportunities to impose losses that are lacking in presidential system 
given that the government are willing to endure the political costs of such a proposal.
^^Pierson,P.D. and Weaver,R.K.(1993), “Imposing Losses in Pension Policy” in Wcavcr,R.K. and 
Rockman,B.A.,cds., “Do Institutions Matter”, The bookings Inst., pp 110.
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Now I will discuss the capabilities needed by thé governments in loss imposition 
which I have not discussed in the previous section; “strong party discipline”, 
“recruitment of ministers from the legislature” and “diffusing or limiting accountability”.
3.3.1. strong Party Discipline
The incongruence between the constituencies of individual members of 
parliament and the general taxpaying public is larger, as members of parliament represent 
electoral districts or smaller interest groups than those represented by the government as 
a whole. Strong party discipline mitigates this problem to some extent, as parties tend to 
internalize the externalities caused by individual decisions within larger constituencies. '^^
Political parties function in nearly every legislature to group and unite individual 
legislators behind common policy goals. They are important in organizing the agenda of 
the legislature and determining its procedures. While all legislative parties perform these 
same functions, there is a great deal of cross-national variation in what they do and how 
they do it, as political parties follow the physical, economic and demographic 
configuration of the country in which they operate. They are shaped, above all, by its 
political structure including whether it is parliamentary or presidential and in particular 
by the nature of the electoral system as a system of choice.
First, legislative parties vary in regard to their connection with the executive. In 
parliamentary systems, members of the governing cabinet are also members of 
parliament and share the same party loyalty as the legislative party or coalition of parties 
that holds a majority. In presidential systems, legislative parties typically have weaker
^^Von Hagen,J. and Hardcn,I.(1996), pp 15. 
38CaIvcrt,P.(I992), pp 124.
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relationship with the executive. Even though they share the same party with the chief 
executive, they often act independently of executive wishes.
Second, legislative parties differ according to their internal structure and the 
degree of discipline that they impose on their members. Legislative parties in 
parliamentary systems are characterized by hierarchical structures and cohesive voting 
patterns. On the other hand, legislative parties in presidential systems, especially those 
operating in United States Congress, have collegial structures and relatively low levels of 
voting cohesion.'^O Structural conditions allow for a maximum degree of policymaking 
autonomy for the legislature collectively as well as for the individual legislators.
In parliamentary systems, political parties tend to be much more cohesive in the 
legislature than in a presidential system. If they were not, the executive would be 
constantly threatened with ouster from office. Also a number of parliamentary systems 
have moved away from the requirement that governments must win all votes to stay in 
power, but most still require a majority on crucial pieces of legislation such as the 
budget. In Germany, a cabinet can be dismissed only by a "constructive" vote of no 
confidence, that is, one that simultaneously elects a successor to the sitting chancellor 
(prime minister).41
Third, legislative parties vary according to whether they dominate the process by 
which members of the legislature are elected. In those political systems where parties 
dominate the process by nominating candidates, and financing and organizing their 
election, the policy making activities of the legislators are likely to be controlled by party
39oi.son,D.M. and Mczey,L.M.(1990), pp 12.
'**’Mezey,M,L.(1990), “Paiiiamenl,s and Public Policy” in OIson,D.M. and Mezey,M.L., eds., 
“Legi.slatures in the Policy Process”, Cambridge University Press, pp 207.
‘^ ‘Lijpharl,A.(1984),"Democracies: Patterns ofMajoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one 
Countries", Yale University Press, pp 75.
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dites and thus legislators will have less lattitude for action.^^ This would increase the 
government’s ability to impose losses on powerful groups. But in those systems where 
elections are largely decentralized and candidate centered, which may lead the 
nomination of the candidates over the opposition of the party leaders, legislators will 
arrive in the legislature with few obligations to the party leaders and will have much 
more attitude for independent policy actions.
Legislators in proportional representation systems typically are selected from 
party lists developed by the central party organizations. Those who deviate from party 
line on important votes may find themselves dropped from the list in the next election. 
Also in virtually all parliamentary systems, legislators' career advancement requires 
cooperation with party lead ers .A lso  party members themselves have an incentive not 
to overturn a government since they would then have to stand for reelection. But this 
alone presumably would not be sufficient to dissuade legislators from voting against their 
party on matters where their constituents feel very strongly about a specific issue and 
thus expect deviation from the party line. Party discipline provides legislators with 
political power to deviate from their constituents' opinions.
Between these, the internal structure of the parliamentary parties and the number 
of parties represented may have also a joint impact on the policy-making role of the 
legislature. The policy activity of parliaments will be greater in party systems where 
parties are numerous and where no-one party or coalition is dominant rather than in 
systems where there are few parties and one party or coalition is dominant.'^^ 
increasing policy activity of legislatures make it harder for loss-imposing proposers to 
convince their colleagues to face the political risk of punishment by voters in the next 
election.
'’^ OIson.D.M. and Mc/xy,M.L.(1990), pp 10. 
'*-^Wcaver,R.K. and Rockmaii,B.A.(1993), pp 13. 
'‘'‘Mezey,M.L.(1990), pp 206.
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When Marku Laakso and Rein Taagepera(1979) index of “effective number of 
parties in the legislature” is considered, parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies 
can be associated with a large number of parties in their legislature whereas presidential 
democracies are not associated with the type of multi-party coalitional behavior as 
expected. The formula takes into account each party’s relative size in legislature as
n
measured by the percentage of seats it holds: N=l/E^ p . Effective number of parties is 
the number of hypothetical equal size parties that would have the same total effect on 
fractionalization of the system. No presidential democracy have more than 2.6 effective 
political parties where of the 34 parliamentary democracies, eleven had between 3 and 
7.45 Although parliamentary systems involve higher number of effective parties in the 
legislature with respect to presidential regimes, they are more likely to impose losses on 
powerful groups because political parties in the presidential systems are weakly 
organized and fragmented.
In many Latin American presidential democraeies, parties are weak and lack 
discipline and that representatives behave in a limited and self-interested way. But these 
characteristies of parties and their representatives make it possible in multi-party systems 
for presidencies to work. A president without a clear majority in a multi-party situation 
with ideological and disciplined parties would find it difficult to govern and even more 
difficult with an opposition majority in the congress.'* ’^
The idea of a more disciplined and responsible party system is in faet, structurally 
in conflict, if not incompatible with pure presidentialism. Presidents have to favor weak 
parties although they might wish to have a strong party of their own if it was assured a
'*-‘’Stepan,A. and Skacli,C.(1994), pp 122. 
'‘6Linz,J.J.(I994),pp34.
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majority in the congress. The weakness of parties in many Latin American countries 
therefore is not unrelated to the presidentialism but rather a consequence of it.^7
Also the relationship between the presidency and the American party system has 
always been difficult. The architects of the constitution established a nonpartisan 
president who, with the support of judiciary, was intended to play the leriding 
institutional role in checking and controlling the "violence of faction" that the framers 
feared would rend the fabric of representative democracy.48 Even after the presidency 
became a more partisan office during the early part of the century, its authority continued 
to depend on an ability to transcend party politics. The president is nominated by a party 
but, unlike the prime ministers, is not elected by it.
In summary, parliamentary systems introduces a stronger party discipline when 
compared to presidential system as the political parties in parliamentary systems are more 
hierarchically organized and cohesive. It is also clear that, political parties play a central 
role in a parliamentary system where as in a presidential system the personal leadership 
and charisma of a presidential candidate can overcome or ignore a fractionalized and 
unstructured party-system.
Now I will discuss the second property that differs between parliamentary and 
presidential systems, “recruitment of ministers from the legislature”, whether it gives rise 
to the government’s ability to impose losses on powerful groups:
47Linz,.I.J.(1994), pp 35.
'’*MiIkis,S.M.(1994),"The Presidency and Political Parlies" in Nelson, M., cds., "The Presidency and the 
Political System", Congressional Quarterly inc., pp 348.
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3.3.2. Recruitm ent of Ministers from the Legislature
Recruitment of ministers from the legislature would increase the ability of 
governments in loss imposition because prime minister can persuade its opponents from 
his party or from parties that constitutes the governing coalition in facing the highly 
visible, concentrated and immediate costs of loss imposition by using ministries as 
promoting tools. On the negative side, it may result in the appointment of unqualified 
and incapable people to the ministries. This would cause inefficiencies in the policy 
implementation of the government.
In most parliamentary systems, heads of executive departments are drawn from 
the elected members of the national legislature with some exceptions like France, 
Switzerland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Norway. They thus tend to bring to their jobs 
political experience and savy and they are more often policy generalists than specialists. 
On the other hand, in presidential systems like United States, members of congress are 
constitutionally prohibited from serving in executive positions. A cabinet member is not 
necessarily a professional politician indeed, most are not.49
In Finland's quasi-presidential system, about two thirds of the ministers after 
second world war, have always been members of the parliament but there is no binding 
behavioral norm prescribing that even the most important ministers should be drawn 
from the parliament.^O
'*^Weaver,R.K. and Rockman,B.A.(I993), pp 14.
SONousiainen, J.(1988),"Bureaucratic Tradilion,Scmi-presidcnlial Rule and Parliamentary Government; 
The case of Finland",European Journal of Political Rcscarch,volI6, pp 252.
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3.3.3. Degree of Centralization of Accountability
Wliile pointing out that concentration of legislative power, absence of 
effective veto points, strong-party discipline and cohesiveness of government elites 
give parliamentary systems important advantages in loss-imposition, centralization of 
accountability may weaken or even remove much of this advantage. Because more 
ccnlralizcd governmental power in parliamentary .systems cau.ses more centralized 
accountability as well. The governing party or coalition may not face the high political 
costs of loss imposition and forgo these proposals that concentrated power would have 
allowed them to do so.
In parliamentary systems, governments are held accountable to the legislature 
through parliamentary debate and questioning by opposition parties, and ultimately by 
the threat of a vote of no confidence. They are also held accountable through the 
retrospective judgements of voters at the next election. Usually it is not possible to 
prevent a government from acting once it has decided on a course of action, but it is clear 
that the governing party or parties and their leaders are the ones who should be held 
accountable, because of building cabinet solidarity and party discipline.
Furthermore, while the centralization of legislative power in parliamentary 
systems increases the government’s accountability, it also decreases the accountability of 
the opposition. The costs of blame generating by opposition parties are likely to be low, 
since they are already excluded from governmental power. They cannot hope to enact 
their own policy preferences while they are out of power, their only hope is to hinder the 
governments efficient policymaking capability.
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On the contrary, accountability is more diffuse in presidential systems because 
power is shared and decisions are bargained between the branches. Knowing that 
legislators are not bound by party discipline makes it easier for constituents to put 
pressure on their representatives. As power and responsibility are so diffuse, it is often 
difficult for voters and interest groups to know whom to hold accountable for loss 
imposition.
Now I will compare parliamentary and presidential systems in the sources of 
Prime Ministerial and Presidential accountability which can be denoted as party, cabinet, 
legislature and the mass public. A broad summary of these accountability relationships is 
portrayed in Table 6.
Table 6
Sources of Accountability
Extent of Accountability 
Prime Ministers Presidents
Party 
Cabinet 
Legislature 
Mass Public
Strong
Strong
Weak
Strong
Moderate to weak 
Nonexistent 
Strong 
Very strong
Source : Nelson,M.(1994), “ The Presidency and the Political System”, Congressional 
Quarterly, pp 69.
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One of the negative characteristics attributed to the parliamentarism in 
accountability issue denotes that the person voting for representatives of a party 
presumably does not know, who the party will support to be the prime minister and if it 
is a multi-party regime in which a party cannot expect to gain an absolute majority, the 
voter does not know what parties will form a governing coalition. But in most cases, this 
is not the case because parties are identified with highly visible leaders. Those leaders 
appeal directly to the voters, and the campaigns for elections increasingly are focused on 
the leader who aspires to be the prime minister.^ ^
Presidents depend very little on cabinet or party approval, but they are greatly 
dependent on the Congress, assuming that their activities require legislative approval. For 
prime ministers, however, party and cabinet are intimately connected. Such a connection 
in the United States is much fainter where the structures are less clearly demarcated. A 
president can control the formal party machinery at the national level, but most of the 
action in political parties remains at the state and local level. In contrast, prime ministers 
are much more dependent on and therefore more accountable to their cabinets and their 
parties. In sum, presidents are usually, less inhibited than prime ministers. But they also 
tend to be more vulnerable because the process is more visible and open and thus not 
easily controlled through prearranged agreements.^2
On the other hand, in a presidential system there is no way to hold accountable a 
president who eannot be presented for reelection. Such a president can neither be 
punished by the voters by defeat nor rewarded for success by reelecting with the same or 
a larger vote than in the previous election. A president who cannot be reelected is 
"unaccountable". It could be argued that in the case of no reelection the party that
5'Linz,J.J.(1994),pp 11. 
^2Rockman,B.A.(I994), pp 69.
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supported the election of the president would be held aecountable, but in fact the parly's 
new presidential candidate is the person aecountable.
In conclusion, accountability in a presidential system is hard to enforce. 
Individual legislators and the president usually can be held individually accountable. 
Accountability is diffused, divided and targeted at individual politicians through the 
system of weak parties and candidate centered politics. Since parties are not responsible 
and accountable for government stability and policy, because those are the tasks of the 
president, they are likely to concentrate their efforts on opposing, criticizing and perhaps 
fiscalizing the executive but not to give it support, respond to its policy initiatives or 
assume responsibility for them.
In a parliamentary system, however, the governing party or parties of a stable 
coalition can be held accountable easily to the voters, as long as the voters do not exclude 
in principle a vote for parties in the opposition. Governing parties, their leaders and even 
the prime minister cannot be made accountable under the certain conditions of 
unstability, shifting coalitions and no dominance occuring in the coalition-making 
process.
Now the important question is whether the opportunity to impose losses afforded 
by the centralization of legislative power is outweighed in practice by the risks posed by 
increased accountability, that is, governing party or coalition’s fear that it will be 
identified with and punished for these losses, Weaver and Rockman(I993) discuss the 
relative influences of concentration of power and accountability effects on loss 
imposition in pension policy in United States, Canada and Britain, and suggest that both 
effects are present and that the concentration of power effect appears to be stronger.
53Linz,J.J.(1994),pp 13.
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Divided governments in the presidential system and coalitions in the 
parliamentary system may provide opportunities in diffusing the accountability but this 
would not improve the ability to impose losses on powerful groups because at the same 
time they weaken the concentration of power, cohesiveness of government elites by 
increasing institutional oppositions. In fact, relative effects of these influences may 
depend heavily on the structure of existing policy and the proximity of elections.
As accountability introduces important risks for governmental loss imposing 
capabilities, dilTcrences in the length of the electoral cycles that increase or weaken 
accountability can be important. Short electoral cycles may be an important obstacle for 
loss imposition because politicians would like to leave a lot of time for the pain of loss 
imposing initiatives to be forgotten. In this sense. United States-Separation of Powers 
system introduces little opportunity for such initiatives as elections are held every two 
years for the house and one-third of the senate.^4
3.4. E iïective Allocation of Resources
Effective allocation of resources involves both the ability to allocate resources to 
areas where they yield highest social welfare and to implement projects at minimum 
cost. Diverse political constituencies may be required in implementation to induce their 
cooperation or compliance with policies they may provide to be against their self- 
interest.
The vulnerability to a political constituency in order to stay in power may not 
have positive consequences for economic growth unless they allocate resources where 
they will yield most efficienct outcomes economically.
5'*Weaver,R.K. and Rockman,B.A.(1993), pp 148.
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Centralization of power in parliamentary systems offers major advantages in 
effective allocation of resources. In a simple or multi-party majority government there 
are relatively few points at which limited interests can gain access and make demand of 
resources. Party discipline also limits the value of legislators’ efforts to act as advocates 
for local interests. Presidential system, on the other hand, introduces many points of 
access in legislative committees and in the need to build coalitions on the floor of 
legislative chambers. Easy access also allocates disproportionate influence to those with 
power, such as members of legislative authorizing committees and appropriating 
subcommittees, either rewarding those members disproportionately or producing an 
overly broad distribution of benefits so as to ensure stable legislative majorities.
Now, the question, whether allocation of resources in parliamentary systems is 
less politicized or whether the politics simply is better hidden resulting in a distribution 
of benefits that is different but not necessarily better, arises. In parliamentary systems, 
political influences on allocative activities can occur in the bureaucracy and within the 
cabinet. The lack of checks may lead to a highly centralized allocation process that is 
used to favor the ruling party or coalition rather than promote allocation of resources 
where they would be more effective and required.
In order to overcome the partisan effect of political pressure in allocating 
resources, government needs “bureaucratic strength and autonomy”. In addition to this, 
“level of interest group access and influence” is also important in maintaining effective 
allocation of resources. Now I will compare parliamentary and presidential systems in 
these issues.
^^Shepsle,K. and Weingasl,B.R.(1981), “Political Prcfcrnces for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization”, 
American Journal of Political Science, vol. 25, pp 96.
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3.4.1. Bureaucratic Strength and Autonomy
Autonomous and strong fiscal bureaucracies are often seen as prequisites for 
effective allocation of resources as they can act independent of elected politicians, and 
pioduce more stable, consistent policies.
Hahm, Kamlet and Mowery (1996), directly analyzes the influence of “strength 
of fiscal bureaucracy” on the size of a country’s fiscal deficit in nine industrialized 
democracies during 1958-1990. They state that, empirically, “stronger a country’s fiscal 
bureaucracy, the lower its deficit” as consistent with the idea that strong fiscal 
bureaucracy will cause effective targeting of resources which is an important aspect of 
reducing budget deficits. Strength of fiscal bureaucracy is including the centralization of 
budgetary decision making, dominance of Ministry of Finance over other ministries 
within the executive branch and the degree to which senior officials in the Ministry of 
Finance are insulated from control by the head of the government by their career status.
Presidential and parliamentary regimes differ also in their bureaucracies whether 
it is professionalized and unified or posses a monopoly on expertise. They differ also in 
degree of discretionary authority that their bureaueracies wield.
Bureaueracies in the presidential systems have been seen as having a relatively 
weak bureaucracy heavily penetrated by politieal appointees at the top, subject to 
political interference at all levels, and prodded in inconsistent directions. It is highly 
constrained and formalized, encumbered by a complex array of structural mechanisms 
that limit the discretion of agencies and their personnel. This makes it difficult to target 
resources effectively in the presidential system. On the other hand, the bureaucracies of 
parliamentary systems are not entirely unbureaucratic in these respects but they are
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formalized and constrained tlian presidential bureaucracies are. They granted more 
discretion to pursue their policy missions as they see fit. They are free of the burdensome 
layering of executive and legislative constraints. It also more likely, owing to the 
unchallenged authority of the party, to resemble a coherent, top-down hierarchy.^6
Short term autonomy of elites, that the degree to which government elites need to 
be responsive to short term group pressures and electoral considerations, is also 
important in maintaining bureaucratic strength and autonomy. There is also substantial 
difference between parliamentary and presidential government in this issue.
A single party majority government in parliamentary system is best able to resist 
such pressures. Minority parliamentary systems or those with teneous parliamentary 
coalitions do not have the luxury of choice. They must generally tailor positions in the 
short run to maintain majority support. On the other hand, political elites in presidential 
system are in an intermediate position: They do not need to be concerned with losing 
their posts by bringing on premature elections, but they do not need to build coalition if 
they wish to get their policy preferences enacted.57
The absence of elite short run autonomy is especially likely to inhibit effective 
targeting by making logrolling coalitions more necessary. It is also likely to affect 
government capability to impose losses on powerful groups.
All I have mentioned about strength and autonomy of bureaucracy up to now 
have concentrated on the allocation of resources where they will yield highest social 
welfare. It is also important to consider the implementation of projects at minimum cost 
in order to reach a full idea of effective allocation of resources.
5'>Moe,T.(I990), “Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story”, Journal of Law, Economics, 
and Organization, vol. 4, pp 239.
^^Wcaver,R.K. and Rockman,A.R.(1993), pp 27.
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Following Vogel (1986), wo can compare Ihc rcgulalory bureaucracies in 
presidential and parliamentary systems by considering the environmental agencies of the 
United States and British Westminister model. Both systems reduce pollution but British 
system do so with lower costs. United States’ system is a political mess by comparison. 
In United States, regulation is rigid, rule-oriented, leaving little discretion for regulators. 
In contrast, British system is more flexible leaving more case by case discretion to 
bureaucrats.^^
In conclusion, parliamentary systems provide more opportunities in effective 
allocation of resources when compared to presidential systems.
3.4.2. Interest Group Access and Influence:
To the extent that interest groups focus their demands on the legislature, they may 
succeed in encouraging legislators to act independently of the executive. Party and 
executive elites, in whose interest is to minimize legislative influence, will work to 
insulate legislators from the interest groups . Increasing interest group influence would 
weaken the effective implementation of government policies by reducing the ability to 
set and maintain priorities, impose losses on powerful groups and especially to target 
resources effectively.
Interest groups vary according to what extent they are functionally specialized. 
More functionally specialized interest groups have relatively more homogeneous 
membership and they focus on relatively more narrow set of issues of specific concern to 
most of the members. In those legislatures where committee system is strong, they direct 
their effort on the committees whose jurisdictions match their interests and they do so as
■‘’*Moc,T.M. and CaldweII,M.(1994), pp 184.
frequeiUly as they involve themselves with relevant administrative ageneies. Thus, 
legislative poliey participation will increase as interest groups are functionally 
specialized and homogeneous in composition.
One of the traditional roles of the legislature is to provide an arena in which 
conflicting groups can articulate their views. Thus, the legislature should have a more 
visible role when groups conflict than in instances of group harmony leading to the idea 
that the parliamentary policy will increase as interest groups disagree among themselves. 
Also it is true that the policy activity of the parliaments increase as the interest groups 
disagree with the operating bureaus.
In the presidential system, interest groups of many kinds can gain access and 
exercise influence at numerous points in the policymaking process. One strong tradition 
in the literature on American politics argues that "iron triangles" tend to develop between 
interest groups, bureaucracies that service those groups and congressional oversight 
committees. As access is relatively open in United States, interest group influence may 
be broadly dispersed and variable over time.^^
In parliamentary systems, centralization of legislative power presumably 
decreases the alternatives open to interest groups, and party discipline makes appeals to 
individual legislators an almost hopeless strategy in terms of changing policy 
outcomes^^. The bureaucracy and cabinet ministers are the main points of access open to 
interest groups. It is also usually impossible to reverse a governments position (if it has a 
majority) once that position has been taken.
•'’^Olson.D.M. and Mezey,M.L.(1990), pp 12.
^^Mczey,M.L.(1990),"Parliaments and Public Policy" in 01son,D.M. and Mezey,M.L.01son,D.M. 
cds,"Legislatures in the Policy Procès", Cambridge University Press, pp 205.
'Weaver,R.K. and Rockman,A.R.(I993), pp
‘^ ^Arter,D.(1984),"Nordic Parliaments: A Comparative Analysis", St. Martin’s Press, pp 31.
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In parliamentary systems, interest groups such as labor unions, realtors and the 
construction industry concentrate efforts more on relevant ministries than the legislature. 
Interest groups are important in monetary politics and their activities may relate to 
increases in legislative interest. Bankers, arguably the most important interest group, tend 
to work directly with the central bank. ^3
On the other hand, structural relationships between interest groups and political 
parties and cabinet members are often even more direct in countries characterized by 
multiple parties and coalition governments such as labor unions and business 
organizations, agrian groups and environmentalists.
In presidential systems, interest groups have a special fear of the president, but 
their fears are limited by separation of powers because legislators share public authority 
with him, check his power, have great power of their own and are very open to what the 
groups want. The state is internally divided. On the other hand, in parliamentary systems, 
interest groups fear from the majority party. The party has its own agenda, its own views 
about what public bureaucracy ought to look like and substantial autonomy to exercise 
public authority in ways to contrary to group interests. But interest groups have much 
more to fear in this kind of system, because the party, unlike the president, has a 
monopoly of public authority. Groups are especially motivated, then, to find means of 
protecting themselves from the party, the state, and its capacity for autonomous action.
With these in mind, parliamentary system also poses two distinctive risks for 
representation of diffuse interests. First, without intense interest by significant number 
voters, leaders are apt to pay little attention to the political representatives of diffuse 
interests, for the simple reason that they do not need their support in order to govern. A 
second risk is that policy gains will be reversed, especially when there is a change in
*^^Lcloup,L.T. and Wooley,J.T.(1990),"Lcgislative Oversight of Monetary Policy", in 01son,D.M. and 
Mczcy,M.L cds,"Legislatures in the Policy Procès", Cambridge University Press, pp 55.
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government or a deeline in public interest. On the contrary, United States’ separation of 
powers system facilitates the political representation of diffuse interests by lowering the 
cost of access as it is not necessary to command the support of a significant number of 
voters to affect the decisions of a congressional committee. Also mechanisms of access 
and substansive policies favoring diffuse interests cannot be easily repealed because of 
multiple veto points in the separation of powers system.
In order to give an example, interest groups activity increased on the federal level 
in the 80’s as the threat of cutbacks made them more sensitive in protecting their 
programs. Even if they shared the view that big deficits damage national interests, they 
could not agree on what should be done to cure the problem. The extraordinary 
procedures devised in the 80’s to deal with fiscal issues, budget summits, reconciliation 
process, tried to weaken groups in making budget policies. But these special procedures 
lost much of their effectiveness as politicians and groups learned how to exploit or 
neutralize the new rules.
Divided governments in presidential system and coalition governments 
characterized by proportional representation in parliamentary system offer advocates of 
diffuse interests greater opportunities for access and responsiveness. Now it is clear that 
diffuse interests are likely to be best represented in a presidential system and least in 
single-party dominant parliamentary.system. Coalition governments appear to fall 
somewhere in between.
In conclusion, interest group access in parliamentary system is often more 
structured and executive-centered than in the presidential system. But this does not mean 
that interest groups are less influential.
‘^ '*Vogel,D.(1993), “Repre.scnting Diffuse InlcrsLs in Environmental Policymaking”, in Weaver,R.K. and 
Rockman.B.A. eds., “Do Institutions Matter”, The Brookings Institution, pp 266.
65Shick,A.(1993),pp 234.
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4. CONCLUSION
The choices of political institutions, especially whether the system of 
government is parliamentary or presidential, affects the capacity of government to reduce 
budget deficits. It is clear that, when nations are choosing a parliamentary or presidential 
form, they are in fact choosing a whole system whose properties will arise endogenously. 
These properties, giving particular decision making attributes to the governments, will 
contribute to their policymaking capabilities in substantially differing policy areas.
A particular decision making attribute while strengthening one policymaking 
capability may decrease another one at the same time. For example, concentrated power 
would be better for imposing losses on powerful groups, whereas it would be worse for 
cleavage management, capability which is important for aspects of governance not 
directly related to budgetary policymaking. Because of this, the important concern is to 
determine the policy objective at first and then to specify the policymaking capabilities 
that are needed in reaching this objective. A comparison of the parliamentary and 
presidential systems can be made according to how their policymaking attributes give 
rise to these specified capabilities. Under differing policy objectives, it is clear that the 
government system that will introduce more opportunities will also differ.
This study has focused on the problems of the budget process, namely, the 
common pool problem, and focused on the policymaking capabilities needed in 
overcoming these problems and thus reducing budget deficits. These policymaking 
capabilities are specified as “setting and maintaining priorities among many conflicting
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demands”, “ability to impose losses on powerful groups” and “elTective alloeation of 
resourees”. Parliamentary and presidential systems are eompared aeeording to these 
eapabilities whieh are influeneed by the polieymaking attributes sueh as “strong party 
diseipline”, “eentralization of legislative power in the eabinet”, “eohesion of government 
elites”, “absenee of effeetive veto points”, “eentralization of aeeountability”, 
“reeruitment of legislatures from the legislature”, “bureaucratie strength and autonomy” 
and “level of interest group aeeess and influenee”.
In parliamentary systems, eentralization of legislative power in the eabinet, elite 
eohesion, and a small number of effeetive veto points all provide important opportunities 
for setting and maintaining priorities among many conflieting demands. It must also be 
noted that, even minority governments in pailiamentary systems, despite their 
susceptibility to less elite cohesion and multiple veto points, provide important 
opportunities in setting priorities among many conflicting demands.
With these in mind, I also mentioned that government instability has been one of 
the strong arguments against parliamentarism but also introduced the forgotten 
perspective following from Mainwarring, that there is a greater cabinet instability in 
presidential systems.
Between government stability, the degree of divergence between alternative 
proposed policies, that is, the degree of the polarization of the political system, is also 
mentioned to have an impact on setting and maintaining priorities among many 
conflicting demands. More polarized political systems are associated with larger public 
debts. In tlie more polarized political systems, thus, it can be proposed that parliamentary 
regimes would be more successful in reducing budget deficits as they involve more 
concentration of power and cohesiveness of government elites and less opportunity of 
access in their policies. I pointed out also that, in such systems, it would be appropriate to
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impIcmciU niujorilarian ciccloral syslcnis in order not to create coalitions reducing 
concentration of powers and cohesion of government elites. Note that polarization of 
political system would introduce higher risks in coalition governments in parliamentary 
and divided governments in the presidential systems whereas presidential system ranks 
between these two and the single party majority governments in parliamentary systems.
Centralization of legislative power in the cabinet, cohesiveness of government 
elites, strong party discipline and absence of effective veto points in parliamentary 
systems provide important opportunities for imposing losses on powerful groups but that 
increased concentration of accountability in those .systems weakens that advantage. The 
first effect is probably stronger on average following from the case study of Pierson and 
Weaver on pension cuts in Britain, Canada and United States. Greater distance from 
elections may have a dramatic effect on strengthening the capacity to impose losses 
regardless of the system. The recruitment of ministers from the legislature in 
parliamentary systems, whych does not exist in presidential systems, may also increase 
the ability to impose losses. Coalitional governments in parliamentary systems are likely 
to find it particularly difficult to impose losses on powerful groups. On the other hand, 
presidential systems provide little opportunities in loss imposition stemming from the 
diffused accountability but significant risks stemming from multiple veto points.
In effective allocation of resources, attention is focused on the government ability 
to allocate resources where they will produce more efficient outcomes and govrnment 
ability to implement projects at minimum cost. Parliamentary systems appear to have 
significant potential in effective allocation of resources with their stronger bureaucracies, 
autonomy of government elites from short-term political pressures, absence of effective 
veto points and less access and influence of interest groups in the policymaking process. 
On the contrary, presidential system lacks all these attributes which give rise to the 
effective allocation of resources.
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Based on the prccccding analysis, we can eonclude IhaL llie govemmeiU ability to 
reduce budget deficits would be higlier in parliamentary systems than in presidential 
systems because in all three required capabilities, parliamentary system introduces more 
opportunities and less risks than presidential systems do. These results are summarized in 
table 7 briefly.
The similarities in capabilities between the presidential system and coalition 
governments in parliamentary system should not be surprising , given that they tend to 
resemble each other and to differ from most party-government and single-party dominant 
regimes in most of the decision making attributes. Both systems are likely to have less 
elite cohesion than the other parliamentary regime types and both are more likely to have 
significant continuity in elected policymaking elites after elections. Of course, there are 
also differences between the two that affect some capabilities. This is, because 
presidential system relies more upon multiple veto points, and involves less concentrated 
power, and weaker party discipline.
On the other hand, divided governments in presidential system obviously lowers 
elite cohesion, and increases the importance of multiple veto points that inhere in 
presidential system further. It also reinforces short-term electoral pressures for leaders of 
the executive and legislative branches of government to generate blame against other. 1 
have also mentioned that, divided governments increases the risks of bidding up and 
stalemate even further.
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The relatively low ability of presidential systems in reducing budget deficits can 
be increased by allowing president to dissolve congress for new elections or allowing 
congress to remove president by a vote of no confidence. This would increase elite 
cohesion and concentration of power in presidential systems. Enhancing central party 
control over legislative candidates such as replacing individual constituencies with parly 
lists may be appropriate.
63
Table 7
PoUcyniaking AUribuies in Parliamentary and Presidential Systems
Parliamentary System Presidential System
Single-party Party Coalition Unified Divided
Dominant Government Government Government
Centralization oi High High Highly No No
Legislative Power variable
in ihe cabinet
Cohesion of High High Highly Highly Less
Government Elites variable variable
ElTeclivc Veto Points Few Few Variable High Higher
(equally complex, if less
formal veto system than unified)
ElTect of polarization Low Low High Low High
and stability
Setline and Maintainine High High Low No significant No
Priorities anione manv opportunities, opportunities. opportunities. opportunity. significant
conllictine Demands no significant no significant risk more risks opportunity.
risk risk more risks
Party Discipline Strong Strong Strong Weak Weak
Reeruitment of
Ministers from Yes Yes Yes No No
the Legislature
Centralization of Highly Centralized Less Diffused More
Accountability Centralized Centralized Diffused
Abilitv to impose High High Low Opportunity, More
losses on powerful opportunities, opportunities. opportunities. more risks opportunity.
erouns risk risk risk more risks
Bureaucratic Strength Strong Strong Strong Weak Weak
and Autonomy (Formalized and Constrained)
Short-term Autonomy Strong Strong Weak Less Weak
of Elites Strong
Level of Interest Group Low Low High Higher Highest
Access and Influence
Allocation of Resources High High Low Opportunity, No
Effectively opportunities, opportunities, opportunities, more risks significant
no significant no significant risk opportunity
risk risk more risks
Ahililv to reduce Highest High Low Low Lowest
Biirlyct Deficits
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